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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the ink dried on the South Carolina Supreme Court's January 2011
decision in Crossmann Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville
Mutual Insurance Co.,' many involved in the construction industry, alarmed by
the court's opinion, were calling for a rehearing of the case as well as a
legislative response to counteract its holding.2 The court ruled, in effect, that the
standard liability insurance policy that general contractors purchase for
construction projects would not cover property damage resulting from their
subcontractors' "faulty workmanship" 3 except in the most unexpected and
4accidental situations. Thus, general contractors who had previously relied on
these insurance policies to manage their risk of defective construction for a
project would now potentially become exposed to greater liability for property
damage claims that occurred as a result of their subcontractors' negligent
workmanship.
5
A. An Introductory Look at Crossmann
The Crossmann litigation arose a few years after the completion of a Myrtle
Beach condominium project, when homeowners discovered numerous
construction defects that caused "substantial decay and deterioration" of the
individual units. 6 The supreme court held that the insurance company was not
required to indemnify under the commercial general liability (CGL) policy it had
issued to the project's general contractor because the property damage was not
the result of an "occurrence," as required by the CGL policy. 7 According to the
court, the subcontractor's faulty workmanship that led to "damage [that] was
1. (Crossmann 1), No. 26909, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 32 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011), available
at http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/advSheets/nol2011.pdf, withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d
589 (2011).
2. See Ashley Fletcher Frampton, S.C. Court Ruling Leaves Contractors on the Hook for
Negligence, CHARLESTON REGIONAL Bus. J. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.charlestonbusiness.com/
news/38364-s-c-court-ruling-leaves-contractors-on-the-hook-for-negligence; Plot Thickens in South
Carolina Builders Liability Brouhaha, COASTAL CONTRACTOR ONLINE, http://www.coastal
contractor.net/article/469.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012); see also Fred Horlbeck, Defects Covered?
No, Says the Supreme Court in Its Latest CGL Coverage Decision, S.C. LAW. WKLY. (Jan. 14,
2011, 3:41 PM), http://sclawyersweekly.com/news/2011/01/14/defects-covered-no-says-the-
supreme-court-in -its -latest-cgl-coverage-decision/.
3. See Crossmann 1, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 45. Faulty workmanship is neither a
legally defined term nor defined in insurance policies.
4. See id. at 46-47; Melissa M. Nichols, Crossmann IH: A Final Consensus on
"Occurrence" and New Allocation Rules for Insurers, 39 DE. LINE, Fall 2011, at 27, 27, available
at http://scdtaa.com/ResourceslDocuments/DefenseLineVol%2039-3.pdf.
5. See Frampton, supra note 2.
6. Crossmann I, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 33.
7. Id. at 49-50.
[VOL. 63: 887
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progressive in nature"8 did not satisfy the occurrence requirement because it did
not constitute a fortuitous accident, but instead, caused the natural and expected
consequences of negligent construction. 9 Although the contractor argued that
the policy's occurrence definition encompassed a broader scope of accidents that
included events such as a continuous exposure to water infiltration or termite
infestation, the court disagreed, reading a strict fortuity element into the
definition, despite the presence of language that suggested otherwise. 
10
The court's failure to follow what was thought to be established precedent
threatened to create unpredictability in the construction community and
immediate anxiety for many legal practitioners.1" Following an outcry over the
decision, the court agreed to rehear the case and received a number of amicus
curiae briefs, reflecting a widespread concern with the implications of CGL
coverage for property damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship. 
12
Eight months later, the court withdrew its initial decision (Crossmann I) and
filed a new opinion (Crossmann II), holding that the insured's CGL policy
covered the property damage to the condominium units because the occurrence
definition was ambiguous and therefore must be construed against the insurer.'
3
The court's reversal in Crossmann H epitomizes the complexity of the
occurrence issue, which the court itself deemed "an intellectual mess.
This Note analyzes the court's reasoning in reaching its two different
conclusions regarding whether a subcontractor's faulty workmanship that causes
property damage constitutes an occurrence within the meaning of the CGL
policy. Part II discusses the development of the standard CGL policy and
provides a background on South Carolina's construction insurance
jurisprudence. Of particular importance is the South Carolina Supreme Court's
analysis of the CGL policy's occurrence requirement in L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous
Fire & Marine Insurance Co.1
5 and Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Newman.
16
Parts III and IV detail the facts, procedural history, and opinions rendered in
Crossmann I and Crossmann II. Part V argues that, by pivoting in Crossmann II
to find coverage under the insured's CGL policy, the court reached the correct
result. Crossmann's position, that property damage caused by faulty
8. Id. at 34. A progressive injury is defined as "an injury that results from an event or set of
conditions that occurs repeatedly or continuously over time, such as long-term exposure to asbestos
fibers or the continual intrusion of water into a building." Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v.
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 11), 395 S.C. 40, 51 n.8, 717 S.E.2d 589, 595 n.8 (2011).
9. Crossmann 1, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 47.
10. See id. at 33-34 & n.1, 46,49.
11. See Nichols, supra note 4, at 27.
12. See Ashley Fletcher Frampton, Legislature Passes Bill Reinstating Coverage for Faulty
Work, CHARLESTON REGIONAL BUS. J. (MAY. 13, 2011), http://www.charlestonbusiness.com/news/
39625-legislature-passes-bill-reinstating-coverage-for-faulty-work?rss=0.
13. Crossmann 11, 395 S.C. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 593.
14. Crossmann I, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 37.
15. 366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005).
16. 385 S.C. 187, 684 S.E.2d 541 (2009).
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workmanship satisfies the occurrence requirement, was reasonable based on the
language of the occurrence definition, precedent, and other jurisdictions'
treatment of this issue. In addition, Part V considers the implications of the case
and the effect of a statute passed to negate the Crossmann I opinion. Finally,
Part VI concludes that Crossmann II has partially unraveled the "intellectual
mess" surrounding CGL coverage disputes in construction defect cases.
11. BACKGROUND
,,17A. "Modem construction [is] a dangerous business ....
CGL insurance is the most prevalent source of liability protection used by
general contractors in the construction industry. 18 Accidents in the course of,
and in the aftermath of, the construction process are common and often
inevitable, even when dealing with the most talented and professional developers
and contractors. 19 The claims that occur in this construction context "frequently
lead to coverage disputes under CGL policies, and such disputes can be complex
and costly to resolve. 20
In existence since the 1940s, 21 the standard CGL policy has undergone
several modifications; however, it has always contained some version of the
66 22your work" exclusion. This exclusion, which is "commonly at issue in
construction defect cases," essentially provides that the insurance agreement will
not cover an insured contractor's own work.23 Thus, with regard to construction
defect claims, generally "[n]o [CGL] coverage is owed for damage solely to the
insured's completed work product." 24 Perhaps the most significant change to the
CGL policy was the adoption, in 1986, of the "subcontractor exception" to the
your work exclusion.25 The subcontractor exception provides that the your work
exclusion does not apply where the property damage in question is caused by a
subcontractor's faulty workmanship.F6 "The exception was a concession by the
insurance industry that the general contractor is unable to monitor and control all
the work of subcontractors, and that property damage arising out of such work is
17. Lee H. Shidlofsky & Patrick J. Wielinski, Commercial General Liability Coverage, in
CONSTRUCTION INSURANCE: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS 67, 67




21. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann I), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 36 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011).
22. Id.
23. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 89.
24. RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE:
KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE 225 (2011).
25. See Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 195, 684 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2009).
26. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 89.
[VOL. 63: 887
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more fortuitous than work that a general contractor performs directly." 27 Because
28subcontractors often perform the majority of the work on construction projects,
the exception greatly narrows the your work exclusion, "often preserv[ing]
coverage for insureds."
29
Before the your work exclusion-or any other policy exclusion or exception
to an exclusion-can take effect, there must be an initial grant of coverage under
the CGL policy's insuring agreement.30 The standard insuring agreement providesbroad coverage. 31 A standard agreement provides in part:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of. . . "property damage" to which this
insurance applies.
This insurance applies to... "property damage" only if:
(1) The "property damage" is caused by an "occurrence" that takes
place in the "coverage territory"; [and] 32
(2) The... "property damage" occurs during the policy period.
As defined in the standard policy, an "occurrence" is "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions." 33 This definition is a modification of the traditional "strict accident
formulation," in which an occurrence was simply defined as an "accident.
34
Although the word accident has always gone undefined in the CGL policy, South
Carolina courts have found it to mean: "[A]n unexpected happening or event,
which occurs by chance and usually suddenly, with harmful result, not intended
or designed by the person suffering the harm." 35  This definition of an
occurrence seemingly "incorporates the requirement of fortuity, which is part and
27. Id.
28. See Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 89 (explaining that contractors rarely self-
perform work); Max Fiester & Joseph H. Langerak IV, Interpretations of "Property Damage" and
"Occurrence," FOR THE DEF., Nov. 2009, at 20, 20-21, available at http://dritoday.org/ftd/
2009-11F.pdf.
29. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 89, 90. It is important to note that the
subcontractor exception does not grant coverage, it simply reinstates coverage that the your work
exclusion took away. See id. at 89.
30. See David Dekker et al., The Expansion of Insurance Coverage for Defective
Construction, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 2008, at 19, 20.
31. Id.
32. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 69 (alteration in original).
33. Id. at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id.
35. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 192, 684 S.E.2d 541, 543 (2009)
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parcel of the basic tenet of insurance that an insured should not be able to control
the risk and obtain insurance coverage for intentional acts."
36
Because of the addition of the "continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions" language in 1986,37 the
current definition purportedly enlarges the scope of what qualifies as an accident
within the meaning of occurrence. This expanded definitional language has
created problems in construction related property damage claims because courts
have found it difficult to reconcile this modern occurrence language with the
fortuity element inherent in all liability insurance policies. 39 For example, in a
"typical [fact] pattern," an insured general contractor constructs a residential or
commercial building, "employ[ing] various subcontractors to assist with the
completion of the project. ''4° After completion of the project, the "owner
discovers defects in the construction-such as defectively installed windows that
are now leaking or an improperly poured foundation that is causing the building
to shift. ' 41 The subcontractor performed the negligent work, and the issue arises
whether the insured's CGL policy will provide coverage for the resulting
42damages. In determining whether the damage to the building-caused by a
period of prolonged water seepage-resulted from an occurrence, there exists a
tension between the arguable lack of a fortuitous event and the application of the
"continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions" phrase. 3 This tension is at the heart of the Crossmann decisions.
The key aspect of the occurrence requirement is the fortuity concept, which
provides that there is no insurance for damage "expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured." 44 CGL policies are not designed to protect against the
"risks that are the normal, frequent, or predictable consequences of doing
business." 45 Although the business risk language now exists as its own policy
exclusion, because it was originally incorporated in the occurrence prong of the
CGL insuring agreement, "issues relating to the fortuity of... property damage
arising out of construction risks are usually determined by reference to the
36. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 72 (emphasis added).
37. See id. (explaining the history of the definition of occurrence).
38. See id.
39. See SIDLOFSKY & WIELINSKI, supra note 17, at 80; see also Philip W. Savrin & Todd
H. Surden, The Evolving Scope of the Occurrence Requirement, FOR THE DEF., June 2009, at 42,
42, available at http://dritoday.org/ftd/2009-06F.pdf ("It is a generally accepted principle of liability
insurance law that policies respond to fortuitous events only.").
40. MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 24, at 221.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 72.
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Century Indem. Co. v. Golden Hills Builders, Inc., 348 S.C. 559, 565, 561 S.E.2d 355,
358 (2002) (quoting ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LtABILTY INSURANCE § 10.01[1] (2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
[VOL. 63: 887
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occurrence requirement." 46 Complicating the analysis of negligent or defective
construction claims is the fact that a subcontractor's work is usually performed
intentionally; however, the subcontractor rarely intends or expects the
consequential damages resulting from such an intended performance.4 7 While
some courts focus on the subcontractor's act itself, to exclude from coverage any
damage caused by faulty workmanship, 48 other courts "focus... on whether the
outcome was intended by the actor.",49  Jurisdictions following the former
approach interpret the word accident narrowly to require "unintentional conduct
by the insured" or the intervention of an external force.51 Jurisdictions that
adhere to the latter approach interpret the word accident broadly to include
events that the insured contractor does not expect, 52 "reject[ing] foreseeability as
the boundary between accidental and intentional conduct.
5 3
In addition to the requirement that the accident result from an occurrence,
the claim must also allege the existence of property damage. As defined in the
standard CGL policy, "property damage" consists of "[pihysical injury to
tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property."
54
Although the property damage requirement has not been as contentious as the
occurrence requirement in construction defect litigation, it is important to keep
the two requirements distinct. It is sometimes incorrectly assumed that either
property damage itself evidences an occurrence or that the existence of property
damage is contingent on the finding of an occurrence.
B. South Carolina Jurisprudence on the "Occurrence" Requirement
Like other jurisdictions around the country, South Carolina has wrestled
with whether CGL policies cover property damage claims resulting from
46. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 72. In Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Newman,
discussed infra Part lI.B.2, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that "an analysis.., as to
whether or not there was an 'occurrence' essentially subsumes" the business risk exclusion. 385
S.C. 187, 197 n.4, 684 S.E.2d 541,546 n.4 (2009).
47. See Savrin & Surden, supra note 39, at 42.
48. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Omnibank, 812 So. 2d 196, 197 (Miss. 2002) ("[The]
action must still be accidental and unintended in order to implicate policy coverage.")
49. See Savrin & Surden, supra note 39, at 44 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 43.
51. See Joel R. Mosher, Occurrences, in THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 51, 63 (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 2010)
[hereinafter REFERENCE HANDBOOK] (quoting Omnibank, 812 So. 2d at 200) (discussing case law
that requires an external force for the accident to be considered an occurrence).
52. Savrin & Surden, supra note 39, at 45.
53. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 74 (citing Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent
Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2007)).
54. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann I1), 395 S.C.
40, 48, 717 S.E.2d 589, 593 (2011); Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 77.
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construction defects and faulty workmanship. 55 In Crossmann I, the supreme
court examined two relatively recent South Carolina cases-L-J, Inc. v.
Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co. and Auto Owners Insurance Co. v.
Newman-that depended upon an interpretation of the occurrence requirement.
56
As in Crossmann, in both of these cases the supreme court changed its original
opinion, reflecting the difficulty in adjudicating construction related CGL
coverage claims. 5  Nonetheless, the court's decisions in L-J and Newman are
critical to understanding the issues presented in Crossmann.
1. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
a. Facts and Procedural History
In this 2005 case, the developer of a subdivision brought an action against a
general contractor, alleging, inter alia, negligent construction of a road system.
58
Four years after subcontractors completed road construction, the subdivision's
roads began "alligator cracking"-a deteriorated condition of distressed asphalt
pavement. 59 The general contractor settled the underlying lawsuit for $750,000
and sou0ht insurance coverage from its four insurers pursuant to its CGL
policies. Although three of its insurers provided insurance proceeds for the
loss, Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Company (Bituminous) refused to
recognize coverage.61 This led the three paying insurance companies to file a
declaratory judgment action seeking contribution and indemnification from
Bituminous. The circuit court delegated the action to a special master who
found that the road damage constituted an occurrence and that Bituminous had a
duty to provide coverage under its CGL policy.
63
b. The South Carolina Supreme Court's Decision
On appeal, the issue before the supreme court was "whether property
damage to the work product alone, caused by faulty workmanship, constitute[d]
an occurrence. ' 64  In determining whether an occurrence existed, the court
55. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 1), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 38-39 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011), withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589
(2011).
56. Id. at 42-44.
57. See Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 190, 684 S.E.2d 542 (2009); L-J,
Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 117, 119, 621 S.E.2d 33, 34 (2005).
58. L-J, 366 S.C. at 119, 621 S.E.2d at 34.
59. Id. at 122, 621 S.E.2d at 35-36.
60. Id. at 119, 621 S.E.2d at 34.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 120, 621 S.E.2d at 34.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 121, 621 S.E.2d at 35.
[VOL. 63: 887
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considered evidence 65 that the subcontractor's negligent design, preparation, and
construction all contributed to the road deterioration. 66 This negligent work-
which constituted the faulty workmanship--damaged only the roadway system,
i.e., there was no property damage beyond the subcontractor's own defective
work product. 67  And, faulty workmanship by itself, the court stated, is not
"caused by 6an accident or by exposure to the same general harmful
condition[]." Accordingly, the court held that the faulty workmanship
constituted a possible breach of contract for unsatisfactory work, not an
occurrence within the meaning of the CGL policy.
69
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's opinion in High Country Associates v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.
70
In that case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court "held that a CGL provided
coverage for property damage caused by continuous exposure to moisture when
the complaint alleged negligent construction that resulted in property damage
and not merely negligent construction damaging only the work product itself.",7'
An occurrence existed, the New Hampshire court held, because the insured made
a claim for damages that were caused by water seepage through negligently
constructed walls-a claim beyond solely the repair of "the contractor's
defective work., 72 In L-J, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that,
unlike in the New Hampshire High Country case, the complaint in L-J alleged
only the costs of repairing the faulty workmanship itself, which does not
constitute an occurrence within the CGL policy.73 According to the court, if the
occurrence requirement had been satisfied on these facts, the court would have
improperly converted the CGL policy into a performance bond.74 As opposed to
an insurance policy which indemnifies the cost of accidents, a performance bond
is a financial guarantee that, if the contractor fails to adequately perform the
construction project, a surety will step in and complete the work pursuant to the
specifications of the underlying contract.75 Finally, the court commented that its
65. One expert witness testified that the subcontractor's failure to properly remove tree
stumps and compact the wet clay in the subgrade created insufficient subgrade preparation. Id. at
122, 621 S.E.2d at 36. In addition, the poorly prepared thin road course contributed to the cracking.
Id. Another expert testified that ill-designed drainage and curb-edge detail along with increased
heavy traffic caused the damage. Id. at 122-23, 621 S.E.2d at 36.
66. Id. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 124, 621 S.E.2d at 36.
70. Id. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (citing High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474
(N.H. 1994)).
71. Id. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (citing High Country, 648 A.2d at 477).
72. Id. at 123-24, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting High Country, 648 A.2d at 477) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 124, 621 S.E.2d at 36.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 124, 621 S.E.2d at 37.
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holding would ensure "that ultimate liability falls to the one who performed the
negligent work-the subcontractor-instead of the insurance carrier.
' 76
2. Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Newman
a. Facts and Procedural History
In this 2009 case, a homeowner brought a lawsuit against the builder of its
recently constructed home, alleging that a subcontractor defectively installed
stucco siding. 77 The homeowner alleged that this faulty workmanship allowed
water intrusion to severely damage the home's wooden framing and exterior
sheathing. 78 After the homeowner received a binding arbitration award, the
homebuilder's insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action to
determine whether it was required to cover the homebuilder's losses under the
CGL policy it had issued.79 The trial court found that the home's property
damage was caused by an occurrence, and was thus covered under the
homebuilder's policy.8° The insurer appealed, arguing that the damage caused
by the defective work was not the result of an occurrence because under L-J, a
subcontractor's faulty workmanship alone "d[oes] not cause an 'accident'
constituting an 'occurrence."' 81
b. The South Carolina Supreme Court's Decision
In approaching this question, the supreme court first looked at the definition
of an occurrence as provided in the CGL policy. 82 "Occurrence" was defined as
"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the
same harmful conditions. ' 83 Because the policy did not provide a definition of
an accident, the court quoted from a 1970 workplace injury case, in which the
court described an accident within the meaning of an insurance contract as "[a]n
unexpected happening or event, which occurs by chance and usually suddenly,
with harmful result, not intended or designed by the person suffering the harm or
76. Id.
77. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 190, 684 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2009). A
consulting engineer testified that the subcontractor "did not meet applicable building code
requirements and deviated from industry standards" by failing to apply thick enough stucco, failing
"to install a weep system or flashing around doors and windows," and failing to use proper
"caulking and banding methods." Id. at 194 n.1, 684 S.E.2d 544 n.1.
78. Id. at 190, 684 S.E.2d at 542.
79. Id. at 190, 684 S.E.2d at 542-43.
80. Id. at 190-91, 684 S.E.2d at 543.
81. Id. at 191, 684 S.E.2d at 543.
82. Id. at 192, 684 S.E.2d at 543.
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[VOL. 63: 887
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hurt.' 84 The court then reviewed L-J, seizing upon a statement in that case that
while faulty workmanship itself is not an accident, "a CGL policy may provide
coverage where faulty workmanship causes ... damage to other property besides
the defective work product." 85 To understand this proposition, the court in
Newman further analyzed the High Country opinion that L-J had relied on and
that had similar facts to Newman. In High Country, the owners of a number of
condominium units alleged that, due to a subcontractor's negligent siding
installation, continuous moisture seeped into the individual units causing
"widespread decay of the interior and exterior walls and loss of structural
integrity over a nine-year period.' 87  The New Hampshire court found it
significant that the claim was not merely to repair the defective siding itself-
which would have been a claim for only faulty workmanship-but rather for
damages to other property that resulted from the faulty workmanship. 88
According to the High Country court, an occurrence existed because the
continuous moisture intrusion, allowed by the defective installation of siding,
caused damage to the property beyond the defective siding itself.
89
Viewing High Country through the lens of L-J, the court in Newman
recognized the existence of property damage beyond the negligent work itself
because the defectively installed stucco created the conditions necessary for the
damage to the home's framing and exterior sheathing. 9° Therefore, the court
said that the claim was not one merely to repair faulty workmanship. 91 Instead,
the "continuous moisture intrusion" qualified as "'an unexpected happening or
event' not intended by [the homebuilder]-in other words, an 'accident'-
involving 'continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful
conditions. ' ' 92  In support of its determination that the continuous water
intrusion qualified as an accident, the court cited a Tennessee Supreme Court
opinion for the proposition that "whether an 'accident' has occurred. . . requires
a court to determine whether damages would have been foreseeable if the
insured had completed the work properly.,93 Thus, the court held that the
home's property damage was caused by an occurrence, and the CGL insurer was
required to cover the homebuilder's losses.
94
84. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 254 S.C. 202, 206,
174 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 193, 684 S.E.2d at 544 (citing L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366
S.C. 117, 123 n.4, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 n.4 (2005)).
86. Id. at 193-94, 684 S.E.2d at 544 (citing High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d
474 (N.H. 1994)).
87. Id. at 193, 684 S.E.2d at 544 (citing High Country, 648 A.2d at 476).
88. High Country, 648 A.2d at 477.
89. Id. at 478.
90. Newman, 385 S.C. at 194,684 S.E.2d at 544.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 194, 684 S.E.2d at 544-45.
93. Id. at 194, 684 S.E.2d at 545 (emphasis added) (citing Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v.
Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tenn. 2007)).
94. Id. at 194, 684 S.E.2d at 545.
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The court swiftly rejected the insurer's argument that "because a
construction professional would expect substantial moisture intrusion from
defective stucco to result" in damage to the home, these damages were barred
from coverage by the business risk exclusion.95 According to the court, it was
"unreasonable to believe that [the homebuilder] expected or intended its
subcontractor to perform negligently," and thus, the homebuilder would not have
expected or intended the damage to the home's framing and exterior sheathing.
96
In addition, even though the damage was to the insured's own project, the court
noted that the your work exclusion did not prevent coverage because the
negligent work was performed by a subcontractor, which triggered the
subcontractor exception to the your work exclusion.
97
In interpreting the occurrence requirement, the court was careful to
distinguish between the subcontractor's negligent application of the stucco and
the property damage caused by the resulting water intrusion.98 In fact, the court
overturned the trial court's holding that the CGL policy also covered the
builder's costs of replacing and repairing the defective stucco itself.99 According
to the supreme court, the "product recall" exclusion applied, which precluded
coverage for any loss incurred by the "repair, replacement, adjustment, removal
or disposal" of the insured's own defective work.t°° The court found that this
exclusion, serving as one of the bases for denying CGL coverage for claims of
faulty workmanship, clearly prevented coverage for the costs associated with the
stucco siding. 101
c. The Dissent in Newman
In his dissent in Newman, Justice Pleicones maintained that there was no
coverage under the CGL policy because the occurrence requirement had not been
95. Id. at 196-97, 684 S.E.2d at 546.
96. Id. at 197, 684 S.E.2d at 546.
97. Id. at 195-96, 684 S.E.2d at 545 ("The facts of this case establish exactly the type of
property damage the CGL policy was intended to cover after the 1986 amendment to the 'your
work' exclusion.").
98. Id. at 197-98, 684 S.E.2d 546-47.
99. Id. at 198, 684 S.E.2d at 546-47. Despite the court's holding on this issue, the court did
not strip these repair and replaced damages because it could not specifically identify them from the
record, and the insurer failed to seek review or contest the arbitrator's damages award. Id. at 198,
684 S.E.2d at 547.
100. Id. at 197-98, 684 S.E.2d at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Shidlofsky
& Wielinski, supra note 17, at 94 (describing the application of the product recall exclusion).
101. Newman, 385 S.C. at 198, 684 S.E.2d at 546-47. It should be noted, however, that the
product recall exception is usually applied to withdrawing multiple "equipment or parts discovered
to have a common fault" from the market, Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 94-95, and the
court's use of it in Newman has been questioned. See id. at 95 ("[T]he application of the exclusion
under these circumstances is open to question, especially where the subcontractor exception
expressly preserves coverage for the cost of repairing and replacing property damage caused by the
defective work of subcontractors, including the work of the subcontractor itself.").
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satisfied."° 2  Justice Pleicones stated that the majority's reliance on the
Tennessee court's treatment of an accident for purposes of the occurrence
definition was "fundamentally inconsistent" with the court's opinion in L-J.1
0 3
According to Justice Pleicones, L-J commanded that "[flaulty workmanship by
subcontractors which leads to deterioration or damages the work product itself is
not an accident," and in Newman, the subcontractor's faulty workmanship did
not cause damage to anything "other than the contractor's work product.
''t4
There was no property damage beyond the work product itself, Justice Pleicones
argued, because the "work product [encompasses] the entire home, including the
stucco, the framing, and the exterior sheathing."10 5 In support of this broad
interpretation of work product, Justice Pleicones cited the language of the your
work exclusion in the policy, which defines your work as "work or operations
performed by you.., and materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection
with such work or operations." 106
C. A Synthesis of L-J and Newman
After L-J and Newman, the law in South Carolina appeared to be that faulty
workmanship or defective construction alone did not constitute an occurrence
within the meaning of the CGL policy.1t 7 However, where faulty workmanship
caused damage beyond the defective work itself, there may be a finding of an
occurrence if the intervening event was deemed an accident, including
"continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful
conditions. ' 8  Continuous moisture intrusion into a home caused by a
subcontractor's negligent work qualified as such an accident where the intrusion
was an unexpected happening or event not intended by the insured.1°9 Thus,
property damage that results from this occurrence, even if consisting of damage
only to the insured's overall project, fell within a CGL policy's initial grant of
coverage. 11 Further, the your work exclusion does not exclude the property
damage covered under a CGL policy if a subcontractor performed the faulty
workmanship.' 1 1 However, the policy does not cover the cost of replacing and
102. Newman, 385 S.C. at 199, 684 S.E.2d at 547 (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (citing L-J, Inc. v.
Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 117, 123, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2005)).
103. Id. at 200 n.6, 684 S.E.2d at 548 n.6 (citing Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore &
Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302,309 (Tenn. 2007); L-J, 366 S.C. at 123,621 S.E.2d at 36).
104. Id. at 200, 684 S.E.2d at 548 (citing L-J, 366 S.C. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36).
105. Id. at 199, 684 S.E.2d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 200-01 n.7, 684 S.E.2d at 548 n.7.
107. See id. at 198, 684 S.E.2d at 546 (majority opinion).
108. See id. at 194, 684 S.E.2d at 544-45.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 194, 684 S.E.2d at 545.
111. Id. at 195-96, 684 S.E.2d at 545.
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repairing the defective workmanship itself as an incidental cost to repairing the
property damage because of the product recall exclusion." 
2
III. CROSSMANN I
A. "[T]he latest and, possibly the greatest, installment in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence involving... construction defect claims. ,113
Against the backdrop of the foregoing case law, the South Carolina Supreme
Court decided Crossmann Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville
Mutual Insurance Co. 114 The disposition of this case proved to be controversial
within the construction and business community, ultimately producing a high
profile rehearing and eliciting a legislative backlash.115
B. Facts and Procedural History
Between 1992 and 1999, Crossmann Communities of North Carolina, Inc.
(Crossmann) developed five condominium projects in Myrtle Beach." 6 In 2001,
the owners of these condominiums realized that the individual units had serious
construction defects, including termite infestation and "substantial decay and
deterioration" caused by water infiltration. 117 The aggrieved homeowners sued
Crossmann, alleging various acts of negligent construction 118 and seeking actual
damages, punitive damages, and the "loss of use and diminution in value."
119
After settling the homeowners' action for approximately $16.8 million,
Crossmann sought indemnification for its losses from the multiple insurance
companies that insured Crossmann's condominium project.120 Several insurers
agreed to settle with Crossmann, 121 but Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company
112. Id. at 197-98, 684 S.E.2d at 546.
113. Stephen P. Groves, Sr., Is It Flip-Flopping or Flop-Flipping? Clarifying Construction
Defects Law in South Carolina, NEXSEN PRUET ON THE DOCKET BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 11:33 AM),
http://nexsenpruetonthedocket.blogspot.com/201 1/01/is-it-flip-flopping-or-flop-flipping.html.
114. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann I), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 32 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011), withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589 (2011).
115. See Frampton, supra note 12.
116. Crossmann I, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 33.
117. Id. at 33-34 & n.1.
118. See id. at 33-34. The complaint alleged the problems were due to "the improper
installation of siding, windows, flashing at the windows, walkway floor sheathing, and wind
resistant tie down straps; deterioration of structural columns and structural components; failure to
completely install the building wrap; flooding of units; water infiltration; failure to properly attach
handrails; failure to properly construct emergency stairs; termite infestation and destruction; and
defective storm water drainage system." Id. at 33 n. 1.
119. Id. at 34.
120. Id.
121. Id. at35 n.3.
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(Harleysville) refused to recognize coverage for the homeowners' damages.
122
Thereafter, Crossmann filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether
its CGL policy had been triggered.123 At trial, the parties stipulated that property
damage to the condominium projects "resulted from water intrusion, that the
damage was progressive in nature, and that the damage was caused by the
negligent construction of the subcontractors." 124 The parties also stipulated that
they "would not argue [over] the applicability of any policy exclusions," and
thus, the trial court was confronted with the dispositive issue of whether the
property damage was caused by an occurrence. 125 The trial court held in favor of
Crossmann, ruling that "the property damage was caused by an occurrence"
because it "resulted from, and was in addition to, the subcontractors' negligent
work itself." 
126
C. The South Carolina Supreme Court's Decision
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court's order, holding that
the damage to the condominiums was not caused b 27an occurrence and that,
without an occurrence, there was no CGL coverage. Writing for the court,
Justice Kittredge summarily rejected Crossmann's argument that because the
negligent work was performed by its subcontractors, the subcontractor exception
preserved coverage for the damage arising out of the faulty construction of the
units. 128 According to the court, for that exception to apply, there must have first
been a finding of coverage, i.e., the policy must have been initially triggered by
property damage resulting from an occurrence during the policy period. 129 The
determination of whether the damage caused by faulty workmanship resulted
from an occurrence in accordance with the terms of the CGL policy required
wading into the "intellectual mess" surrounding the various approaches to
interpreting a CGL policy. 130
The court began its analysis by examining the two general, divergent views
jurisdictions have taken regarding whether CGL coverage exists for damages
caused by faulty workmanship. The majority rule provides that faulty
construction-induced damage does not result from an occurrence because the
consequences of a contractor's intentional work (that is later deemed to be of
122. Id. at 34.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 11), 395 S.C.
40, 46, 717 S.E.2d 589, 592 (2011).
126. Crossmann I, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 33, 47.
128. Id. at 37.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 38.
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poor quality) can never truly be considered an unintended accident.132 The court
pointed out that the majority rule has generally been justified by two somewhat
interrelated rationales. One rationale rests on the view that a CGL policy is
designed to insure tort risks-not the business risks associated with a
construction project. 133 Whereas a CGL policy contemplates coverage for bodily
injury and damage to other property, faulty workmanship that harms just the
contractor's own project is viewed simply as the contractor's failure to perform
his end of the bargain. 134 According to this view, the failure to fulfill the
economic expectations of the third party does not represent a tort, but rather a
breach of contract that requires the contractor to accept the financial obligations
connected with repairing the defective work.135 The court explained that at the
heart of the second rationale for the majority rule is the reasoning that an event
where faulty workmanship directly causes property damage lacks the required
fortuity element of an accident within the meaning of the occurrence term. 1
36
Consistent with the idea that an "insured should not be able to control the risk"
of triggering an insurable event,' 37 liability insurance is meant to cover only
accidental and unintended events, thereby excluding damage resulting from
negligent construction which, the court stated, is the "natural and ordinary
consequence of the faulty work."1 38  The court explained, however, that a
common criticism of the majority rule is that the finding of an occurrence
becomes contingent on the extent of the resulting damage, i.e., if the faulty
workmanship causes damage to a third party's property, there exists an




133. Id. at 39. Business risks are defined as "risks which management.., cannot effectively
avoid because of the nature of the business operations; and risks which relate to the repair or
replacement of faulty work or products. These risks are a normal, foreseeable and expected incident
of doing business and should be reflected in the price of the product or service rather than as a cost
of insurance to be shared by others." Peter J. Neeson & Phillip J. Meyer, The Comprehensive
General Liability Policy and Its Business Risk Exclusions: An Overview, in REFERENCE HANDBOOK
ON THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: COVERAGE PROVISIONS, EXCLUSIONS, AND
OTHER LITIGATION ISSUES 75, 78 (Peter J. Neeson ed., 1995) (citing George H. Tinker,
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance-Perspective and Overview, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q.
217,224 (1975)).
134. Crossmann 1, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 39.
135. See id. at 39-40; see also SMITH, CURRIE & HANCOCK'S COMMON SENSE
CONSTRUCTION LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION PROFESSIONAL 525 (Thomas
J. Kelleher, Jr. & G. Scott Walters eds., 4th ed. 2009) ("[Ihe contractor bears the business risk of
replacing or repairing defective work to make the building or project conform to the agreed
contractual requirements.").
136. Crossmann 1, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 40.
137. See Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 72 (noting that the fortuity requirement is
"part and parcel of the basic tenet of insurance that an insured should not be able to control the risk
and obtain insurance coverage for intentional acts").
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The minority rule provides that where property damage is caused by faulty
workmanship, an occurrence exists, unless the insured intends or expects the
accident.14° The court stated that jurisdictions applying the minority approach
make no distinction between tort risk and business risk. 41 To illustrate the rule,
the court cited a Tennessee case for the proposition that an accident is present
where the faulty workmanship causes an event that is unforeseen from the
insured's point of view--even if the insured intends the act that eventually
causes the accident. 142 As noted by the court, the common criticism of the
minority rule is that it, arguably, converts an insurance liability policy into a
performance bond.' 43 Under either theory, however, the court pointed out that
there is no CGL insurance for repairing or replacing the faulty workmanship
itself.144
Following this discussion on the different interpretations of standard CGL
policies, the court then revisited its L-J and Newman opinions, explaining the
important distinction between the two.145 In L-J, because the damage was solely
to the contractor's work product (the roadway), it did not result from an
occurrence. 146 On the other hand, in Newman, because the property damage to
the home extended beyond the defective work product itself, the progressive
water intrusion amounted to an occurrence. 47 At this point in Crossmann 1,
however, the court made a significant about-face and decided that its reasoning
in Newman was flawed. 148  According to the court, by focusing on the
"continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions"
language, the Newman court ignored the fortuity element inherent in the concept
of an accident.149 The court stated that, under the proper interpretation of the
occurrence requirement, Newman should have been decided against the insured
because the continuous moisture intrusion was not a fortuitous event and, thus,
not an accident. 
50
After making this pronouncement, the court declared that the Newman
opinion's property damage analysis remained on solid legal footing. 15' The
court insisted that it was not adopting the Newman dissent's view that damage to
a different part of the same structure caused by faulty workmanship simply
140. Id.
141. See id.




145. See id. at42.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 43-44 (citing Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 194, 684 S.E.2d
541,544-45 (2009)).
148. Id. at 44 (citing Newman, 385 S.C. at 194, 684 S.E.2d at 544-45).
149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Newman, 385 S.C. at 194, 684 S.E.2d at
544-45).
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results in damage to the contractor's own work product, which cannot constitute
an occurrence.152 The court found fault with this bright-line rule, pointing out
that coverage could be triggered in such a work product scenario as long as the
resultant property damage was "caused by an occurrence." 153 To demonstrate
the viability of its new approach, the court described two hypothetical examples
of where faulty workmanship that damaged only the insured work product would
constitute an occurrence and, thus, be covered under a CGL policy.154 In the
first example, during the construction of an apartment building, the subcontractor
installs defective electrical wiring, which later causes the completed building to
sustain fire damage.' 55 In the second example, while building a new home, a
subcontractor negligently constructs the foundation of the residence. After
moving into the home, the homeowner hires a landscaper to plant shrubs in the
yard. The landscaper, using a Bobcat machine to dig a ditch, accidentally
collides with the home's foundation and, due to the defective construction, part
of the house collapses. 156  In each illustration, a fortuitous event, i.e., the
sparking of the electrical fire and the Bobcat's collision with the foundation,
effectuates an accident, which in turn causes damage beyond the original
defective part. Although each accident caused damage only to the insured's own
work product, because the damage arose out of an occurrence, it would still
trigger coverage. 1
57
Before addressing the facts of Crossmann, the court synthesized the
foregoing principles: "[Flaulty workmanship is not an occurrence," however,
"faulty workmanship can cause an occurrence" if the ensuing damage resulted
from a fortuitous accident. 158  Consequently, the issue before the court
crystallized into whether faulty workmanship that directly causes injury to
otherwise non-defective property within the same overall project satisfies the
occurrence requirement.'t 9 The court resolved this issue by returning to the
policy definition of an occurrence: "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."
16
0
While the term accident went undefined in the CGL policy, the court
acknowledged, as it did in Newman, 161 that it previously defined an accident as
"an unexpected happening or event, which occurs by chance and usually
suddenly, with harmful results, not intended or designed by the person suffering
152. Id. (citing Newman, 385 S.C. at 199, 684 S.E.2d at 547 (Pleicones, J., dissenting)).
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at 45 (citing NAT'L UNDERWRITER Co., FIRE, CASUALITY & SURETY BULLETINS,
PUBLIc LIABILITY, at A3-14 (2001) [hereinafter NAT'L UNDERWRITER CO.]) (these examples were
presented to the court by Harleysville and published by the National Underwriter Company).
155. Id. (quoting NAT'L UNDERWRITER CO., supra note 154, at A3-14).
156. Id. (quoting NAT'L UNDERWRITER CO., supra note 154, at A3-14),
157. Id. at 46.
158. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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the harm or hurt."162 The court also noted that Black's Law Dictionary provides
that an accident is an "unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence;
something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be
reasonably anticipated."' 163 Based on these definitions, the court reaffirmed that
the meaning of an accident necessarily incorporated the notion of fortuity, that is,
a "chance" event. 164 Furthermore, the court cited with approval a pair of Illinois
appellate court opinions for the proposition that damage caused by faulty
workmanship does not result from an occurrence where that damage was the
"natural and ordinary consequence[]" of the construction defect. 165 Although not
expressly stated, the court implied that the natural and ordinary damage could
not be the result of an accident because there is nothing fortuitous in a causal
relationship between an act and its expected consequences. 166
Equipped with this refined occurrence definition-interwoven with its
fortuity component-the court held that the extensive property damage to
Crossmann's condominium units was not caused by an occurrence under its
CGL policy.167 According to the court, because the water intrusion damage to
the condominium units was the natural and expected consequence of the
contractor's defectively installed siding, the injury-causing event lacked the
necessary fortuity element of an accident.168 The court rejected the argument
that an occurrence existed under the "continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same harmful conditions" language or that this modern
definitional phrase created an ambiguity in the policy. 169 The court explicitly
held that this language in the modern occurrence definition "neither create[d] an
ambiguity for insurance contract construction purposes nor diminishe[d] the
fortuity element inherent in an accident." 170 While acknowledging that other
jurisdictions may disagree with its analysis, the court concluded that allowing
coverage in these factual scenarios would convert the insurance policy into a
performance bond. 171
The court then briefly turned its attention away from the occurrence
requirement and towards the property damage requirement.172 The court made it
162. Crossman I, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. I at 46 (quoting Collins Holding Corp. v. Wausau
Underwriters Ins. Co., 379 S.C. 573, 578, 666 S.E.2d 897, 899-900 (2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
163. Id. at 46-47 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 13 (8th ed. 2005)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
164. Id. at 46.
165. Id. at 47 (citing Viking Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 831 N.E.2d 1, 15





169. Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 47.
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clear that its holding did not support an inexorable rule that damage to the
insured's work product can never constitute property damage under a CGL
policy. 173 The court again referenced the hypothetical situations provided by the
National Underwriter Company as examples of where the property damage
requirement could be satisfied by damage to an insured's own work product.
Building on this point, the court was forced to address its L-J opinion, in which
the court remarked in a footnote that while a CGL policy may provide coverage
for "damage to other property, [it would] not in cases where faulty workmanship
damage[d] the work product alone." t75  The court, in Crossmann I, was
concerned that this language could be misinterpreted to mean that a CGL
policy's property damage requirement is met only by damage to a third party's
property. With little elaboration, the court stated that such an interpretation
would be inconsistent with the "policy as a whole."'177 Thus, the court expressly
embraced a narrow interpretation of work product, which "encompasses only the
alleged negligently constructed component and not the non-defective
components" of the insured's overall project.178
The court then reiterated its holding to make clear its decision in the case.
The court provided that the first step in resolving a CGL coverage dispute is to
identify "whether there has been an occurrence."' 179 An occurrence is proven
only by evidence of a fortuitous accident.' 8  When a general contractor
negligently constructs a home and the negligence results in further damage to the
structure, the occurrence requirement is not satisfied, unless there exists "an
unintended, unforeseen, fortuitous, or injurious event."'181  If there is an
occurrence, then the court will determine whether the resulting damage is
covered as property damage under the policy. 182 Damage to the contractor's own
project can qualify as property damage as long as the damage in question is
separate from the initial defective component.' Because Crossmann's
subcontractor's faulty workmanship caused damage that was only the natural and
expected result of faulty workmanship, there was no fortuitous accident, and
thus, no occurrence, and no insurance coverage. 184
173. Id. at 47-48.
174. Id. at 48.
175. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366








183. See id. at48.
184. Id. at 49-50.
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D. The Concurrence
Justice Pleicones, concurring in the result, 185 wrote his own opinion based on
a point he articulated in his Newman dissent-a general contractor's work
product is the entire structure in question.186 According to Justice Pleicones, a
simple application of the original meaning of L-J to the Crossmann facts
warranted finding no coverage.187  Under L-J's established rule, faulty
workmanship by a contractor or a subcontractor that results in property damage
to the insured's work product does not cause an occurrence; therefore, in
Crossmann, the subcontractor's faulty construction work that resulted in
continuous damage to each respective condominium unit did not constitute an
occurrence. 88 Notwithstanding his differing view on the work product issue,
Justice Pleicones seemingly approved of the majority's imposition of a fortuity
element into the occurrence definition.189 He referenced the court's sparked fire
scenario as an example where a contractor's work "truly [causes] an accident"
and where the resultant damage to the work product would trigger CGL
coverage. 190
E. The Aftermath
Caught off guard by the court's opinion,' 91 construction lawyers in South
Carolina quickly mobilized in an attempt to blunt the potential impact of the
ruling on their clients.' 92  Advocating on behalf of homebuilders and other
construction professionals, these lawyers argued that the decision would have a
deleterious effect on the construction industry, already languishing because of
the recession, by prohibitively increasing the costs of business for contractors
and subcontractors. 93  The General Assembly responded to these lobbying
efforts by passing a bill designed to negate Crossmann I, mandating that faulty
workmanship that causes property damage be treated as an occurrence within the
meaning of the CGL policy. 94 This legislation took immediate effect on May
185. Id. at 51 (Pleicones, J., concurring).
186. See id.; see also Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 199, 684 S.E.2d 541,
547 (2009) (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
187. Crossman 1, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 51 (Pleicones, J., concurring) (citing L-J, Inc. v.
Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 117, 123, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2005)).
188. See id. (citing L-J, 366 S.C. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36).
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. See Groves, supra note 113; Clay Olson, Harleysville v. Crossmann Decision Diminished
by SC Legislature, SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LAW (May 17, 2011, 8:21 PM),
http://southcarolinaconstructiondefense.wordpress.com/2011/05/17/harleysville-v-crossman-
decision -in-south-carolina-trumped-by-sc-legislature-this-afternoon/.
192. See COASTAL CONTRACTOR ONLINE, supra note 2; Olson, supra note 191.
193. See Nichols, supra note 4, at 27.
194. COASTAL CONTRACTOR ONLINE, supra note 2; see also Clifford J. Shapiro & Kenneth
M. Gorenberg, The New Wave of Insurance Construction Defects? Four States Enact Statutes
20121
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17, 2011.195 However, by that time, the supreme court had already agreed to
rehear the case on May 23, 2011.196 At the rehearing, the court heard spirited
arguments from the two parties, and in addition, accepted twelve briefs filed bya
diverse group of amicus curiae, many of whom also presented oral arguments.
IV. CROSSMANN H
On August 22, 2011, the South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew its initial
opinion and issued a refiled opinion, affirming the trial court's order that
Crossmann's CGL policy covered the damage to the condominium. 198 Again
writing for the court, Justice Kittredge acknowledged the difficulty courts have
had nationwide-particularly in progressive damage cases-in assessing the
existence of an occurrence within the meaning of a CGL policy. 199 This problem
in applying the occurrence definition to a progressive damage factual situation,
the court recognized, reflected the term's "lack of a clear meaning. '' 2° The court
determined that the additional "continuous or repeated exposure to substantially
the same general harmful conditions" language created an ambiguity in the
occurrence definition that, according to basic contract interpretation principles,
must be construed against the insurer.201 Therefore, the court held, on rehearing,
that the CGL policy's insuring agreement was triggered because the "repeated
water intrusion" constituted an occurrence that caused property damage.
202
To explain this result, which was diametric to its withdrawn opinion, the
court returned to Newman, which also involved progressive damage due to
continuous water intrusion. 203 The court noted that in Newman it originally held
Favoring Coverage for Faulty Workmanship, THE NATIONAL L. REV. (July 15, 2011),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-wave-insurance-construction-defects-four-states-enact-
statutes-favoring-coverage-faulty-.
195. S. 431, 119th General Assem. (S.C. 2011) (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70
(Supp. 2011)).
196. See COASTAL CONTRACTOR ONLINE, supra note 2
197. See Frampton, supra note 12; Nichols, supra note 4.
198. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 1!), 395 S.C.
40, 44, 717 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2011). Much of the court's discussion in Crossmann II addresses the
problem of how to allocate losses in a progressive damage case where successive insurers cover the
project. See id. at 50-67, 717 S.E.2d at 594-603 (adopting the "time on risk approach to defin[e]
the scope of each CGL insurer's obligation"). This question requires the court to ascertain precisely
when each policy was triggered. Id. at 52, 717 S.E.2d at 595. Because there was a finding of no
occurrence in Crossmann 1, the court did not have to address the trigger and allocation issues in that
opinion. This Note leaves an analysis of those topics for another day.
199. Id. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 592.
200. Id. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 592-93.
201. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court cited Super Duper, Inc. v. Pa. Nat'l
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 385 S.C. 201, 210, 683 S.E.2d 792, 796 (2009), for the well-established
proposition that "[a]mbiguous terms must be construed in favor of the insured," Crossmann II, 395
S.C. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 593.
202. Crossmann 1I, 395 S.C. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 593.
203. See id. at 48, 717 S.E.2d at 593.
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that the property damage to the home was caused by an occurrence under the
broader "continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful
conditions" accident formulation. 204 Justice Kittredge reworked the rationale
utilized in Newman to reach the same outcome, explaining that, in determining
whether progressive damage triggers CGL coverage, it is important to first
analyze separately the property damage requirement. 205  Chiefly defined as
"[pihysical injury to tangible property," 20 the term "property damage" implies
damage to property that "was not defective at the outset," but that was "injured"
after a specific event.207 The court unequivocally endorsed the view that, in
contrast to claims for replacement of a defective component part or fixing faulty
installation, which are not claims for property damage,20 8 "a claim for the costs
of repairing damage caused by the defective work... is a claim for property
damage." 2  Then, the court stated that only after property damage has been
established will the court reach the occurrence requirement.
According to the court, the Newman outcome was congruent with this new
analytical framework.21 The replacement of the defective stucco in Newman did
not constitute property damage because the stucco was not "initially proper and
injured thereafter." 212 On the other hand, the alleged damage to the home's
sheathing and framing constituted property damage because it was initially non-
defective work that was subsequently injured. According to the court in
Crossmann II, the property damage in Newman resulted from an occurrence
because the occurrence term was ambiguous and was thus construed in favor of• 214
the insured. This clarified explanation of how coverage was triggered in.... 215
Newman reconciled the holding in that case with Crossmann I. Accordingly,
the court held that Harleysville's CGL policy was similarly triggered by property
216damage that resulted from an occurrence. Because the damage to thecondominium units reached beyond the original negligent construction,
204. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C.
187, 194, 684 S.E.2d 541, 544-45 (2009)).
205. Crossmann 11, 395 S.C. at 48, 717 S.E.2d at 593.
206. Id. See supra text accompanying note 54 for the complete definition of property damage
in a standard CGL policy.
207. Crossmann I1, 395 S.C. at 49, 717 S.E.2d at 593.
208. Id. The cost associated with this damage would also be excluded under the product recall
exception. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
209. Crossmann II, 395 S.C. at 49, 717 S.E.2d at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id. at 49, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
211. See id. at 49-50, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
212. Id. at 49, 717 S.E.2d at 593-94.
213. Id. at49, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
214. Id. 49-50, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
215. See id.; see also Marc M. Schneier, South Carolina Supreme Court Rules That
Subcontractors' Faulty Installation of Exterior Components Caused "Property Damage" in the
Form of Water Injury to Buildings' Nondefective Components; the Repeated Water Intrusions
Constituted an "Occurrence" Under Developer's CGL Policy, 32 CONSTRUcTION LiTIG. REP., Oct.
2011 at8, 8.
216. Crossmann 1l, 395 S.C. at 50, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
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Crossmann established the existence of property damage. 217 Regarding whether
this property damage resulted from an occurrence, the court concluded that the
occurrence term was ambiguous and must be construed against Harleysville.
218
V. AN ANALYSIS OF CROSSMANN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION
LAW
To anyone listening to the oral argument at the rehearing, the court's
reversal of course in Crossmann II was hardly unexpected.2 19 The court was
clearly concerned with the outcome in Crossmann 1.220 The Justices' line of
questioning appeared just as much framed to answer whether Crossmann could
convince the court to withdraw its initial opinion, as whether Harleysville could
convince the court not to withdraw the opinion. 22 While the court's holding that
coverage existed may have been foreseeable, the court's reasoning was
somewhat surprising considering that the court in Crossmann I specifically
rejected the view that the "continuous or repeated" language created an
ambiguity in the occurrence definition.222
In any event, there were strong countervailing arguments against the result
in Crossmann I based on the language of the occurrence definition, the court's
precedent, and other states' treatment of the issue. The rationale employed by
the court in Crossmann I to find that coverage was triggered-that the
occurrence definition is ambiguous and must be construed against the
insurer 223-is appropriate given the multitude of diverging and conflicting
opinions and general confusion regarding the issue. Because both parties had
reasonable interpretations of the occurrence definition within the meaning of the
CGL policy, the court exercised the most viable option by forging a compromise
between the two competing positions. Nonetheless, the analytical framework
established in Crossmann II for adjudicating construction related claims under a
CGL policy may indicate that South Carolina will join those states holding that
an occurrence exists where faulty workmanship causes damage to non-defective
component parts of an insured's project. This possibility should only be
explored with regard to the state statute enacted to negate the court's initial
ruling.
217. See id. at 44, 50, 717 S.E.2d at 591,594.
218. Id. at 50,717 S.E.2d at 594.
219. Oral Argument at tape 1, side 2, Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins.
Co. (Crossmann 11), 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589 (No. 26909) (available at the Clerk of Court's
office at the South Carolina Supreme Court). All references to "oral argument" herein are
references to the oral argument at the May 23, 2011, rehearing.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 1), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 49 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011), withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589 (2011).
223. Crossmann I1, 395 S.C. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 592-93.
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A. An Ambiguity: Two Reasonable but Conflicting Interpretations
Crossmann II resolved the coverage dispute in favor of the insured
contractor because the property damage prong of the insuring agreement was
first satisfied in the form of injury to previously non-defective work beyond the
224faulty workmanship. On the question of whether this property damage
resulted from an occurrence, the court deemed the occurrence term ambiguous
because it "lack[ed] ... a clear meaning," and construed it against the insurance
company./25 That the term occurrence lacked a clear meaning does not mean
that the term lacked meaning altogether, i.e., that the parties could not have each
had a reasonable understanding of the term.226  A policy term need not be
ambiguous in the abstract to be construed against the drafter. An ambiguity must
be construed against the drafter if it is created by "reasonable disagreement [over
its] interpretation., 2 7  Thus, by acknowledging an ambiguity, the court
impliedly accepted as a reasonable interpretation of the occurrence term both
Crossmann's view that the project's exposure to continuous water intrusion
satisfied the policy term's definitional language, and Harleysville's view that
damage directly resulting from faulty workmanship lacked the necessary fortuity
element inherent in an accident.
1. Insured Contractor's Interpretation Was Reasonable
a. Consistent with the Plain Meaning of the Occurrence Definition
The court's acknowledgment that Crossmann's interpretation of the
occurrence term was reasonable is appropriate considering the plain meaning of
its definition: "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions."228 The parties stipulated
that water intrusion caused the damage to the condominium units and that the
water intrusion was a result of faulty workmanship. The parties also
stipulated that the damage was progressive, starting within thirty days of each
230units' certification for occupancy and not ending until each unit was repaired.
224. Id. at 50, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
225. Id.
226. See High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994) (citing Smith
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 164, 166 (N.H. 1987)) (explaining that there can be reasonable
disagreement as to meaning between parties).
227. See id. (citing Smith, 536 A.2d at 167); see also Architex Ass'n v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27
So. 3d 1148, 1157 (Miss. 2010) ("Ambiguities exist when a policy can be logically interpreted in
two or more ways, where one logical interpretation provides for coverage.").
228. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 72 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
229. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 1), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 34 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011), withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589 (2011).
230. Crossmann 11, 395 S.C. at 46, 717 S.E.2d at 592.
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Thus, each unit was continuously exposed to the faulty workmanship from
approximately the time the project was completed until the time the damage was
discovered. During this period, because of the defective siding, sheathing, and
windows, water repeatedly infiltrated the structures of the condominium units,
causing "substantial decay and deterioration. 231 Therefore, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the condominium units, plagued by water intrusion, were in a
general state of harmful condition. The units were exposed to these harmful
conditions both continuously, because the units remained defective during this
period, and repeatedly, because water infiltrated the units over the course of a
few years.
According to the definition of occurrence, even if an event qualifies as the
"continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions," the event still must be deemed an accident to meet the occurrence
232requirement. However, the mere presence of the "continuous or repeated
exposure" language implies that certain qualifying accidents do not have to be
characterized as sudden or isolated. By its own terms then, the occurrence
definition contemplates progressive damage situations where the accident is not
immediately apparent. Thus, Crossmann's position that the repeated water
intrusion constituted an occurrence is all the more reasonable, considering the
broader meaning of an accident that attached with the addition of the
"continuous or repeated" language.
b. Consistent with Newman and Other States
The holding of Crossmann I was unsettling not only because of the presence
of the "continuous or repeated" phrase in the occurrence definition, but also
because the court previously relied on that language in Newman to find an
occurrence in a progressive damage situation. 3  By making operative the
"continued or repeated" language, in conjunction with South Carolina's
traditional definition of an accident, Newman determined that an influx of
moisture into the home constituted an occurrence. 234 Newman's reliance on the
"continued or repeated" provision is not uncommon as other courts have also
235found this language especially applicable in water intrusion cases.
For example, in Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,
the Kansas Supreme Court held that water leakage into a home as a result of
defective windows met the CGL policy's occurrence definition because the
231. Crossmann 1, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 33-34 & n.1.
232. SHIDLOFSKY & WIELJNSKI, supra note 17, at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
supra text accompanying note 33.
233. See Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 194, 684 S.E.2d 541, 544-45
(2009).
234. Id.
235. See Timothy P. Law, What Is an "Occurrence"?, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE:
CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW, Fall 2010, at 83, 100.
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faulty workmanship caused "continuous exposure of the home... to moisture,"
which "in turn caused damage. ''236 In another defective windows case, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that water penetration that led to the deterioration
of a hotel's interior constituted an occurrence under the insured's CGL policy.
237
Because the water penetration was an event, not foreseeable by the insured, that
included the "continued or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful conditions," the CGL policy covered the resulting damage.23s  A
Louisiana appellate court, faced with the familiar fact pattern of leaking
windows and doors as a result of defective stucco application, summarily
concluded that "[r]egardless of the cause of the leaks, this was 'continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,"' and
239thus, an occurrence.
Indeed, these cases support the argument that, despite the fortuity
component, the "continuous or repeated exposure" clause of the occurrence
definition contemplates coverage for progressive damage situations, such as
continuous water intrusion into the home. Moreover, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, in High Country Associates v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,
stated that it was reasonable to interpret "accident" to mean an unexpected or
unintended happening-not necessarily involving "a sudden and identifiable
event. ' 240 According to that court, "[o]ccurrence has a broader meaning than
accident because occurrence includes an injurious exposure to continuing
conditions as well as a discrete event."241 The South Carolina Supreme Court
utilized this broader interpretation of the occurrence requirement in Newman;
242
however, in Crossmann I, the court jettisoned this formulation in a similar
progressive damage factual situation.
243
2. Insurer Harleysville's Position Was Reasonable
Though a departure from its reasoning in Newman, the court's holding in
Crossmann I that the condominium units' exposure to water intrusion did not
constitute a fortuitous accident, and thus was not an occurrence,244 was by nomeans an unreasonable position. It is widely accepted that CGL polices respond
236. 137 P.3d 486, 495 (Kan. 2006); see Law, supra note 235, at 100 (citing Lee Builders, 137
P.3d at 488, 495).
237. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tenn.
2007).
238. Id. at 308-09 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. McMath Constr. Co. v. Dupuy, 897 So. 2d 677, 679, 681 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
240. 648 A.2d 474,478 (N.H. 1994).
241. Id. at 477 (quoting Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 517 A.2d 800, 802 (N.H. 1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 194, 684 S.E.2d 541, 544-45 (2009).
243. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 1), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 44 (S.C. Jan. 7,2011), withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589 (2011).
244. Id. at 49-50.
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only to fortuitous events, 245 and it is not uncommon for courts to rationalize that
the policy covers "only injury resulting-from accidental acts and not injury
accidentally caused by intentional acts." For example, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania recently held that property damage resulting from a
subcontractor's faulty workmanship was not covered where water leaked
through a home's defective stucco exterior and windows. 247 The court stated
that the repeated water intrusion into the interior of the structure did not
constitute an occurrence because the "natural and foreseeable acts, such as
rainfall, which tend to exacerbate the damage, effect, or consequences caused ab
initio by faulty workmanship also cannot be considered sufficiently
fortuitous. ' 248 According to the court, even if the damage causing event was
categorized as a "continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions," there would still be no occurrence.249 The court
said that the continuous or repeated language was not a separate standard for
meeting the occurrence requirement and did not diminish the necessary fortuity
element in an accident.25 °
Jurisdictions that adhere to this approach instruct that without the fortuity
requirement the risk of a subcontractor's faulty workmanship would be shifted to
the CGL insurer and act as a disincentive for general contractors to avoid
inexperienced subcontractors. 251 In fact, the South Carolina Supreme Court
originally appeared to support this notion, stating in L-J that its finding of no
occurrence would place "ultimate liability" on the party who was negligent,
which in turn would "encourage contractors to choose their subcontractors more
carefully. '252 In addition, the court's concern in both L-J and Crossmann I, that
a finding of an occurrence where faulty workmanship causes damage would have
transformed the CGL policy into a performance bond, is shared by other
253jurisdictions. This concern is even more prevalent due to the almost universal
245. See Savrin & Surden, supra note 39, at 42.
246. Id. at 43 (quoting Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1364 (N.D. Ga.
2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. Millers Capital Ins. Co. v. Gambone Bros. Dev. Co., 941 A.2d 706, 713-14 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2007).
248. See id. at 713 (citing Kvaerner Metals Dir. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa. 2006))
249. See id. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted).
250. Id.
251. See Savrin & Surden, supra note 39, at 44 (quoting Gen. Sec. Indem. Co. v. Mountain
States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529, 536 (Colo. App. 2009)).
252. See L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 117, 124, 621 S.E.2d 33, 37
(2005).
253. See, e.g., Essex Ins. Co. v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Ark. 2003) ("The purpose of a
CGL policy is to protect an insured from bearing financial responsibility for unexpected and
accidental damage to people or property. It is not intended to substitute for a contractor's
performance bond... " (quoting Nabholz Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 F.
Supp. 2d 917, 922 (E.D. Ark. 2005))).
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use of subcontractors for construction projects.25 If a CGL policy covered the
consequential damages of each subcontractor's faulty work, the argument goes,
then it would essentially be insuring the full performance of the project.
255
Recent decisions from other jurisdictions taking this view256 lend credence to
Harleysville's argument that its CGL policy was not intended to cover the
damage to the condominium project caused by the faulty workmanship of the
insured's subcontractors. 57
3. The Court Forges a Compromise
At oral argument for Crossmann II, the court gave signs that the Crossmann
I decision troubled them. 258 Chief Justice Toal expressed skepticism at the
proffered examples of a realistic situation in which progressive property damage
resulting from a subcontractor's defective construction would be covered under
Crossmann I.259 Justice Beatty probed whether Harleysville could reconcile the
strict fortuity element imposed in Crossmann I with the policy's "continuous or
repeated exposure" language in the occurrence definition.2(o The court did not
sound persuaded that there were realistic circumstances in which the occurrence
requirement would ever be satisfied under the "continuous or repeated" language
and still possess the necessary fortuity element. 261 Though the court recognized
that this language broadened the meaning of the occurrence definition, the court
in Crossmann II decided against returning to Newman's express allowance of
insurance coverage under that provision.262  While Crossmann may have
presented a strong argument that the condominium project's long-term exposure
to the consequences of faulty workmanship constituted an occurrence, the court
was not prepared to jettison the fortuity requirement, which it must have
continued to see as "central to the principle of liability insurance." 263 Hence, the
court "adhere[d] to the result in Newman," while purportedly clarifying that
coverage was triggered in that case as a result of an ambiguous term being
construed in the contractor's favor 26-not directly because the water intrusion
254. See Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 89.
255. See Nabholz, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (explaining the risks covered in a performance bond
versus a CGL policy).
256. SHIDLOFSKY & WIELINSKI, supra note 17, at 74 (citing decisions from Arkansas,
Pennsylvania, Hawaii, and Kentucky).
257. See Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 11), 395
S.C. 40, 45, 717 S.E.2d 589, 592 (2011).




262. See Crossmann H, 395 S.C. at 48, 50, 717 S.E.2d at 593-94.
263. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 83.
264. Crossmann U, 395 S.C. at 48, 50, 717 S.E.2d at 593-94.
2012]
29
Bruton: The Rise and Fall of Crossmann: The South Carolina Supreme Court'
Published by Scholar Commons, 2012
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
constituted an accident, including the "continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions. 265
The court's conclusion that an occurrence is an ambiguous term and must be
construed against the CGL insurer thus represents a reasonable compromise
between the opposing results of Newman and Crossmann .266  The South
Carolina Supreme Court is not alone in concluding the term to be ambiguous.
267
The problem with the words occurrence and accident, is that "[e]very one seems
to 'know' what they mean, yet there is little judicial consensus in their
application to certain factual scenarios, particularly negligent or defective
construction.' ' 268 And as the amici Associated General Contractors of America
and Carolina ACG argued at the rehearing, it is incumbent upon the insurance
companies, as drafters, to use clearer language. 269 Across the country, parties
have spent years litigating the meaning of occurrence as used in CGL policies,
and no judicial consensus has come remotely close to being reached.27' The
court clearly agreed with the amici that, instead of wasting more judicial time
and resources struggling with this term, the court should simply construe it
against the drafter, who was in the singular position of being able to specify the
precise scope of coverage. 271 Interestingly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
in High Country, which the court chiefly relied upon in both L-J and Newman,
determined that accident was an ambiguous term and should be construed
against the insurer. 272 Considering its previous reliance on High Country,273 it is
puzzling that the South Carolina Supreme Court did not cite that case for the
ambiguity proposition adopted in Crossmann H. Nonetheless, it is fitting that the
court's use of the ambiguity concept is consistent with High Country in light of
the court's invocation of that case in both L-J and Newman.
265. See id. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 592.
266. See id. at 50, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
267. See, e.g., High Country Assocs, v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994) (noting
that the term "accident" is ambiguous, rendering "occurrence" ambiguous since accident is part of
the definition of occurrence (citing Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. Foreman, 641 A.2d 230, 233 (N.H.
1994))).
268. Law, supra note 235, at 105 ("[P]erhaps the most obvious question is too often left
unasked: Is the definition of 'occurrence' ambiguous?").
269. Oral Argument, supra note 219, at tape 2, side 1.
270. Id.; see also Mosher, supra note 51, at 70 ("Courts and litigators have struggled with
whether a particular claim resulted from an accident, occurrence, or unexpected and unintended
conduct. The practitioner is cautioned to review the law of the jurisdiction at issue-these concepts
are often litigated, and holdings are disparate.").
271. Crossmann 11, 395 S.C. at 47 n.4, 717 S.E.2d at 593 n.4 ("[I]f insurers intend to preclude
this construction, it is incumbent upon them to include clear language accomplishing this result.").
272. High Country, 648 A.2d at 478 (citing Green Mountain Ins. Co., 641 A.2d at 233); see
Law, supra note 235, at 105.
273. See supra notes 70-73, 86-90 and accompanying text.
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B. Crossmann II Has Put South Carolina on the Minority Rule Trajectory
The court's holding in Crossmann II, that the occurrence definition was
ambiguous, 274 does not moot the importance of analyzing the court's precise
approach because in construction defect cases "the choice of rationale employed
can have a dramatic effect on the extent of coverage owed."275 By basing its
decision on the ambiguity principle, the court, in Crossmann I!, neither
repudiated the majority rule nor endorsed the minority rule discussed in
Crossmann .276 However, the court's disposition of the case is more consistent
with those states holding that damages flowing from defective workmanship
trigger an occurrence as long as the event was neither intended nor expected by
the insured. This is evident because the court (1) followed two leading minority
rule jurisdictions in narrowly interpreting work product, and (2) ruled out one of
277the two justifications for the majority rule.
1. The Court's Narrow Work Product Interpretation
Although the court withdrew Crossmann I, and it is not South Carolina law,
principles extracted from that opinion may serve to define the parameters of
CGL coverage under the Crossmann II framework. Crossmann I's express
approval of narrowly construing work product to encompass only a component
part of the project27s was employed in Crossmann H to determine that the
damages to the condominium units consisted of something beyond the faulty
workmanship. 279 This narrow work product interpretation struck a parallel chord
in Crossmann II's property damage analysis when the court stated that property
damage has been appropriately alleged when there is a claim of damage to
property that was "initially proper and injured thereafter., 280  The court cited
both United States Fire Insurance Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc.2 8 1 and Travelers
Indemnity Co. of America v. Moore and Associates, Inc.282 for the proposition
274. Crossmann H, 395 S.C. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 592-93.
275. MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 24, at 222.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 131-144. Whether the court's decision is labeled
under the majority or minority approach is of no great importance as cases within each rule have
various permutations, rationales, and inconsistencies. See Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at
74. Some have questioned whether the so-called minority rule is even truly the minority viewpoint.
Law, supra note 235, at 111 ("[T]he majority/minority balance on this issue is always shifting, and
the count remains close."). After all, "[t]he trend in the case law favors coverage, based on the view
that inadvertent construction defects resulting in property damage may constitute an occurrence."
Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 73.
277. See infra Part V.B1-2.
278. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 1), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 48 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011), withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589 (2011).
279. Crossmann 11, 395 S.C. at 50, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
280. Id. at 49, 717 S.E.2d. at 593.
281. 979 So. 2d 871, 889-90 (Fla. 2007).
282. 216 S.W.3d 302, 311 (Tenn. 2007).
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that there is a "difference between a claim for the costs of repairing or removing
defective work, which is not a claim for property damage, and a claim for the
costs of repairing damage caused by the defective work, which is a claim for
property damage."
283
While the court's statement does not directly pertain to the occurrence
requirement, the distinction being drawn is important because it emphasizes
whether an injurious event took place, separating the property damage from the
faulty workmanship. By focusing on this separation between act and
consequential result, a court would seemingly be more amenable to the argument
that an insured contractor did not intend or expect damage resulting from a
subcontractor's performance.284 In addition, it is noteworthy that the court cited
J.S. U.B. and Moore because they have been described as representing the "recent
trend of state courts finding that physical damage resulting from inadvertent
construction defects constitutes an occurrence under a CGL policy. '' 285  In
J.S. U.B., the Florida Supreme Court rejected the idea that a general contractor is
presumed to intend or expect damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty
workmanship where the damage is to the insured's work product. 286 The court
also rejected the idea that a breach of contract is never an occurrence, stating that
"there is nothing in the basic coverage language of the current CGL policy to
support any definitive tort/contract line of demarcation. 287  In Moore, the
Tennessee Supreme Court similarly rejected the insurer's argument that damages
caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship were not covered because it was
foreseeable to the insured contractor that water penetration would result from
"improperly installed windows. ' 288 Similarly, other courts have pointed out the
fallacy in making foreseeability the standard for triggering an occurrence:
"Insurance premiums are based on actuarial risk. The reason why consumers
buy insurance is because of foreseeable risks. 289
On the issue of what constitutes the insured's work product, it is interesting
that Justice Pleicones did not write separately in Crossmann II to reaffirm that
work product should be defined broadly to incorporate the entire condominium
project.290 One would have expected this objection to the court's ruling that
283. Crossmann 11, 395 S.C. at 49, 717 S.E.2d at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. See, e.g., French v. Assurance Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 693, 699, 704 (4th Cir. 2006)
(applying Maryland law, the court used a subjective test to determine that the insured general
contractor did not expect or intend that the home's walls and structure "would suffer damage from
moisture intrusion" as a result of a subcontractor's faulty application of synthetic stucco).
285. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 74.
286. See Law, supra note 235, at 101 (citing J.S. U.B., 979 So. 2d at 883).
287. J.S.U.B., 979 So. 2d at 884 (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673
N.W.2d 65, 77 (Wis. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
288. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tenn.
2007).
289. See Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 107-08 n.32; see, e.g., Lamar Homes, Inc.
v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2007).
290. See Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 199-201, 684 S.E.2d 541, 547-58
(2009) (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (explaining his work product theory).
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resultant damage to otherwise non-defective component parts may constitute
property damage. 291 One possible explanation for Justice Pleicones siding with
the majority is that he based his Newman dissent on the L-J holding that faulty
workmanship that results in damage to the work product was not covered
because there was no occurrence-not because there was no property
damage.292 In fact, in Newman, the court did not separately analyze the property
damage requirement, 293 and thus, there was no occasion to consider the
definition of work product within the property damage context. In contrast,
Crossmann II separately discussed whether the damage caused by the faulty
workmanship constituted property damage within the meaning of that term in a
294CGL policy. Justice Pleicones may have thought that the property damage
definition allowed for a narrow interpretation of the work product term, whereas
the occurrence definition, under L-J's precedent, required the broader work
product interpretation. It is also possible, however, that he concluded along with
the rest of the court, that the occurrence requirement was simply too ambiguous
to apply in a progressive damage case, as evidenced by the continuing problems
the policy term caused.
2. The Court Rejects the Business-Risk/ITort-Risk Distinction
Lost in Crossmann I's acceptance of the fortuity element justification for
the majority rule was the court's apparent rejection of the business-risk/tort-risk
justification for the majority rule.295 In that opinion, the court noted the
incongruence in basing the occurrence analysis on the issue of "which property
is damaged"-as the majority rule does-rather than on the nature of the damage
causing event itself.296 The court's later acknowledgment that damage to the
insured's own product could potentially be covered (after a fortuitous event) 297
undermines the premise of the business-risk/tort-risk theory that damage
resulting from faulty workmanship to the insured's project is an uninsurable
economic loss.298 The court's aversion to the business-risk/tort-risk theory was
manifested in Crossmann I1. In that opinion, the court could have held that there
was no occurrence because the possibility of damage to the condominium units
291. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossnann 11), 395 S.C.
40, 48-50, 717 S.E.2d 589, 593-94 (2011).
292. Newman, 385 S.C. at 199, 684 S.E.2d at 547 (2009) (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (citing L-J,
Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 117, 123, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2005)).
293. Id. at 191-94, 684 S.E.2d at 543-45 (2009) (majority opinion) (discussing property
damage in the context of an occurrence).
294. Crossmann I, 395 S.C. at 48-59, 717 S.E.2d at 593-94.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 132-135.
296. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann I), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 38 & n.5, 41 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011), withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d
589 (2011).
297. See id. at 49.
298. See Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 80 (explaining the business risk concept).
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represented the business risk that the insured's product would not meet the
project's contract specifications, and thus the contractor would simply be liable
in contract. Instead, however, after deciding that it was ambiguous whether the
continuous moisture intrusion possessed the necessary fortuity component, the
lack of which justifies finding no occurrence under the majority rule, the court
held that coverage existed for the property damage.
299
Of course, the court's rejection of this distinction between contract risk and
tort risk does not mean that it will jettison the fortuity requirement. However, it
arguably negates one of the major bases courts employ for denying coverage for
damages arising out of faulty workmanship: that allowing coverage would
improperly convert the CGL policy into a performance bond.30 The
performance bond argument provides that damage to the insured's work product
caused by faulty workmanship is not covered by a CGL policy that insures only
fortuitous risks; instead, it would be properly covered by a performance bond
that guarantees the performance of the specifications of the underlying
construction contract. 301  The premise of this argument is that there is a
distinction between the risk of property damage or bodily injury and the risk that
the contractor will default on his obligations. 302 This distinction is similarly
303made in the business-risk/tort-risk justification for the majority rule. Because
the Crossmann II opinion is inconsistent with the business-risk/tort-risk theory, it
would seem that the court would be reluctant to further embrace the performance
bond argument where damage exists beyond the faulty workmanship.
Interestingly, in Crossmann I, the court stated that courts using the business-
risk/tort-risk justification generally "first address whether there has been
property damage" and courts using the fortuity justification "first address
whether there has been an occurrence." 3°4  The court later adhered to that
statement by analyzing first whether the occurrence requirement was satisfied.30 5
In Crossmann II, however, the court switched the order of its analysis, expressly
stating that the property damage inquiry must be conducted first and the
occurrence inquiry second. 306  The significance of this change is unknown;
however, it is interesting that the Crossmann II analytical framework is the
opposite of the framework explicitly mentioned in Crossmann I as being used by
299. Crossmann I1, 395 S.C. at 50, 717 S.E.2d at 594.
300. See Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 81.
301. See Law, supra note 235, at 106.
302. See Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 81-82.
303. See Savrin & Surden, supra note 39, at 43.
304. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 1), No. 26909,
Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 39-40 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted),
withdrawn, 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589 (2011).
305. Id. at 46.
306. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 11), 395 S.C.
40, 49, 717 S.E.2d 589, 594 (2011).
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those courts that reason property damage caused by faulty workmanship "does
not possess any element of fortuity ... and, therefore, [is] not accidental."30
C. The Effect of S.C. Code Ann. § 38-61-70
The implications of Crossmann I must be considered in light of the
legislation that the South Carolina General Assembly passed in the wake of
Crossmann 1.308 For purposes of construction related work, this statute defines
an occurrence in a CGL policy as "(1) an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions; and (2)
property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship, exclusive
of the faulty workmanship itself.''309 This statute, the result of intense lobbying
from segments of the legal and business communities, intended to override the
result in Crossmann 1310 and attempted to foreclose the courts from reading the
fortuity component into the occurrence definition.
311
By its terms, the statute retroactively applies to pending and future disputes
312
over CGL policies already in existence. However, at oral argument, Chief
Justice Toal immediately rejected Crossmann's opening request that the court
align its holding with the goal of the newly passed statute. Additionally, the
court stated in Crossmann II that it would not apply, ex post facto, a statute
designed to dictate the "construction [of an] existing insurance polic[y]" pending
in the judicial system.314 The court's nondeferential stance on the statute may
have presaged the law's own vulnerability-it is currently under constitutional
attack in a lawsuit filed in the South Carolina Supreme Court under the court's
original jurisdiction. 315 Harleysville brought this lawsuit, alleging that the statute
violates both the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution by impairing
insurance contracts already in existence, 316 and the Separation of Powers Clause
of the South Carolina Constitution317 by legislative encroachment on the judicial
branch of government.
318
307. Crossmann 1, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 40.
308. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70 (Supp. 2011).
309. Id. § 38-61-70(B)(1)--(2) (emphasis added).
310. See Frampton, supra note 12.
311. See id.
312. § 38-61-70(E).
313. Oral Argument, supra note 219, tape 1, side 1; see Michael Ethridge, What Happened at
the Crossmann Communities Rehearing?, CARLOCK COPELAND INS. COVERAGE CORNER (June
2, 2011), http://www.insurancecoveragecomer.com/occurrence/what-happened-at-the-crossmann-
communities-rehearing- 1/.
314. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 11), 395 S.C.
40, 50 n.6, 717 S.E.2d 589, 594 n.6 (2011).
315. Complaint at 6-13, Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. State (S.C. May 23, 2011), available at
http://insurancecoveragecorner.com/complaint.pdf.
316. Complaint, supra note 315, at 8-10 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1).
317. Complaint, supra note 315, at 6-8 (citing S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8).
318. Complaint, supra note 315, at 7; COASTAL CONTRACTOR ONLINE, supra note 2.
2012]
35
Bruton: The Rise and Fall of Crossmann: The South Carolina Supreme Court'
Published by Scholar Commons, 2012
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
If the statute survives this constitutional challenge, the court will have to
determine its continuing effect in future coverage disputes. One South Carolina
practitioner suggests that Crossmann II diminished the significance of the
legislation because the court's opinion achieved the goal of the statute: "A
determination that damage arising from faulty workmanship, with the exception
of the faulty work itself, is an occurrence." 319 One possible issue with the
statute's language is that the definition of an occurrence now includes "property
damage ... resulting from faulty workmanship." 320  A strict reading of that
phrase reveals a potential problem-property damage itself is never an
occurrence; rather, property damage may result from an occurrence. 321 Courts
may understand this statutory provision to mean that the occurrence requirement
is satisfied where faulty workmanship directly causes property damage.
However, the supreme court in Crossmann II specifically delineated that the
property damage and occurrence requirements were to be analyzed separately.
322
Therefore, the lower courts must follow the two-step legal framework for
determining whether CGL coverage exists in construction defect lawsuits.
While it is possible that insurance companies will tweak the language of their
CGL policies in response to the court's ruling, that result may achieve the court's
overall goal in deeming the occurrence term ambiguous: force the insurance
companies to use clearer language in expressing the party's intentions.
323
Indeed, "the insurance industry is constantly changing and revising policy
language in reaction to construction industry changes as well as to court
decisions interpreting and applying the language of insurance policies. 324
VI. CONCLUSION
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision that a CGL policy's
occurrence definition lacks clear meaning has, ironically, brought greater clarity
to this contentious area of the law. The supreme court's two prong legal test
separating the property damage and occurrence questions will provide guidance
to trial judges and parties litigating CGL coverage in construction cases.
Damage to the insured contractor's otherwise nondefective work product as a
result of a subcontractor's faulty workmanship will likely be covered as long as
no policy exclusions apply; however, the costs of repairing or replacing the
defective work itself will not be covered. This prognosis is supported by the
319. Nichols, supra note 4, at 30 n.3.
320. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70(B)(2) (Supp. 2011).
321. Shidlofsky & Wielinski, supra note 17, at 72 ("[P]roperty damage [is] caused by an
occurrence.").
322. Crossmann Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. (Crossmann 11), 395 S.C.
40, 49, 717 S.E.2d 589, 594 (2011).
323. Id. at 47 n.4, 717 S.E.2d at 593 n.4 (urging insurers to use clearer language to accomplish
their intended result).
324. SMITH, CURRIE & HANCOCK'S COMMON SENSE CONSTRUCTION LAW: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION PROFESSIONAL, supra note 135, at 524.
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intent of S.C. Code Ann. § 38-61-70-should this statute overcome its
constitutional challenge-as it also distinguishes between damages arising from
faulty workmanship and any costs for repair or replacement.
325
An insured contractor seeking insurance coverage for property damage
caused by a subcontractor's negligence must be able to assert facts that meet the
standard of a reasonable interpretation of the occurrence requirement. A court
will not construe the occurrence term in favor of the insured contractor if the
event giving rise to the coverage claim cannot reasonably be deemed "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions." 326 Nonetheless, given the inherent uncertainty in
litigating over a term deemed ambiguous, the South Carolina Supreme Court
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